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I. INTRODUCTION
In their recent book, The Limits of InternationalLaw,' Professors Jack
Goldsmith and Eric Posner attempt to explain "how international law works"2
using rational choice theory. As the title of the book suggests, the authors put
forward a pessimistic vision of international law. Their most controversial
claims are that customary international law has no "exogenous influence on
state behavior,"3 and that they "are skeptical that genuine multinational
collective action problems can be solved by treaty."4
Once customary international law and multilateral treaties are dispatched,
of course, there is not much international law left. The primary form of
international law in which the authors have any confidence is the bilateral
treaty, which they believe is capable of resolving at least some cooperation
problems. Beyond this, Goldsmith and Posner seem to accept the relevance of
international law only when it serves to resolve coordination games. But
coordination games can be resolved through any number of nonlegal
mechanisms. They can be addressed through informal communication,
unilateral declaration, a first-mover, an exchange of letters, and more. That
international law can achieve the same result is modest praise indeed.
If Goldsmith and Posner are correct, then, international law is much less
important than its proponents often claim, and it has much less potential to
address the world's challenges. Cooperation on environmental matters,
nuclear proliferation, human rights, global poverty, disease, and more is
largely beyond the reach of international law. These are strong propositions.
To advance their claims, Goldsmith and Posner offer both theoretical
arguments and case studies. The case studies, which form an important part
of the book, lack persuasive force unless the theory presented in Limits is
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convincing. This is so in part because case studies, by their very nature, have
a limited ability to support the sort of sweeping claims made by the authors,
and in part because the way in which the case studies are presented is
problematic and the conclusions drawn from them seem unwarranted.'
This Essay takes on the theory advanced by Goldsmith and Posner. In
particular, it challenges the way in which they dismiss the role of reputation
in international law. The main point I wish to make is simple. An argument
that international law is limited in some way is not persuasive unless it
addresses the main mechanisms by which proponents of international law
claim it works. One of these mechanisms is reputation, and Goldsmith and
Posner's theory fails to account for this influence.
Goldsmith and Posner rule out traditional explanations of international law
by assuming that states are rational and care only about their own interests.
States have no preference for compliance with international law;6 they are
unaffected by the "legitimacy" of a rule of law;7 past consent to a rule does not
generate compliance; and there is no assumption that decision makers have
internalized a norm of compliance with international law.8 One could take
Goldsmith and Posner to task for these assumptions, of course, and others have
done so.' My own view is that these are reasonable and, indeed, desirable
assumptions.' 0 We must model state decision making in some way, and there
remains no coherent alternative model that can be used to generate predictions
about behavior.
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Guzman, The Promiseof InternationalLaw, 92 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2006).
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Once a rational state is assumed it is necessary to consider appropriate
theories of compliance, the most popular of which posits that reputation
encourages states to comply with international law." This Essay lays out a
theory of reputation and explains why Goldsmith and Posner's dismissal of
reputation is unjustified.
II. REPUTATION IN THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
In The Limits of InternationalLaw the authors state from time to time that
they not only consider the role of reputation, but actually believe it affects state
behavior. They state, for example, that when states refrain from violating
treaties, they do so "for the same basic reason they refrain from violating
nonlegal agreements: because they fear retaliation . . . or some kind of
reputational loss. '' 2 According to Goldsmith and Posner, reputation and
retaliation "both may be at play when states cooperate."13 "We do not deny
that states and their leaders care about their reputations. They clearly do care,
and we have relied on reputational considerations earlier in this chapter."' 4
So Goldsmith and Posner believe that reputation can affect state behavior.
Indeed, in the context of bilateral relations they rely on reputation (along with
reciprocity and retaliation) to explain cooperation. In the context of
multilateral relations, however, despite their claims to the contrary, they
dismiss reputation. They do so first by observing that "reputational argument
must be made with care."' 5 Following that statement they offer four reasons
why they are skeptical of reputation's role, at least in the multilateral context.
They then proceed to ignore reputation altogether.
First, they point to an argument made by George Downs and Michael Jones
that states do not have a single reputation but, instead, have multiple
reputations. 6 A state might, for example, have "a good record complying with
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trade treaties and a bad record complying with environmental treaties."'" The
claim that states have multiple reputations is certainly plausible, but it does not
follow that there is reason to be skeptical of the role of reputation. As is
shown below, it only means that we must think of a state's reputation in a more
compartmentalized fashion. To use Goldsmith and Posner's example, if a state
has a good reputation in the trade area but a poor one in the environmental
area, it will find it easier to enter into trade treaties than environmental treaties
(all else equal) because its commitments will be more credible. It will also
have a stronger reason to comply with its trade commitments, namely to
preserve its good reputation. In the environmental context, in contrast, the
state may hot have much reason to worry about compliance, because it has
little reputation to protect and it may determine that it is too costly to build a
good reputation in that area. Even this simple analysis makes it clear that
reputational concerns will affect compliance. At least with respect to trade
commitments, the state has a relatively strong reputational incentive to
comply.
Another reason advanced for the authors' skepticism is that treaties are
sometimes rendered obsolete by changing circumstances. The implication
seems to be that violation of an obsolete treaty cannot possibly lead to
reputational sanctions. This seems roughly correct (depending on how one
defines an obsolete treaty), but, again, has no bearing on whether reputational
concerns affect state behavior. A treaty is obsolete if the parties no longer
consider it to be binding, or if circumstances have changed so much as to make
fulfillment of the relevant obligations unrealistic. Another way of saying this
is that neither party cares about compliance, or perhaps one party has such a
powerful reason to violate the treaty that neither side expects compliance. This
simply does not speak to the question of whether international law can
generate an incentive to comply.
Finally, Goldsmith and Posner offer two related arguments that dismiss
reputation on the grounds that it does not dominate all other concerns faced by
a state. They contend on the one hand that states have "multiple reputational
concerns, many of which have nothing to do with, or even are in conflict with,
a reputation for international law compliance."' 8 On the other hand they
observe that compliance rates vary from one treaty to another and claim that
this is difficult to explain if one adopts a reputational model. Both of these
arguments misunderstand the role that reputation can play. Nobody could
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possibly believe that a reputation for compliance trumps all other factors. But
to jump from this to a dismissal of reputation makes no sense. Every factor
that a state considers operates at the margin, and reputation is no different. If
states have concerns about their legal reputation (as Goldsmith and Posner
concede) then reputation puts a thumb on the scale in favor of compliance.
Furthermore, as soon as one admits that other factors are relevant, there is no
reason to think that compliance rates will be the same across all treaty areas.
Ill. A SIMPLE REPUTATIONAL THEORY
Although the dismissal of reputation in The Limits of InternationalLaw is
problematic, the authors are correct to observe that no good theory of
reputation currently exists.' 9 Understanding how reputation can affect
international law requires elaboration of how states acquire and lose
reputation, how they make decisions in light of reputational concerns, and how
non-reputational and reputational concerns interact.
There is no particular reason why such a theory cannot be developed.
Though a full elaboration is beyond the scope of this Essay, the very simple
model that follows illustrates how state behavior and reputation might interact.
Start with the simplest possible model of reputation. A reputation for
compliance with international law is valuable because it allows states to make
more credible promises to other states. This allows the state to extract greater
concessions when it negotiates an international agreement.2 ° When a state
violates a commitment, it signals a willingness to ignore international law and
therefore suffers a reputational loss. Of course, if a state can lose reputation,
it must also be able to gain it, and this presumably occurs when a state
complies with its legal obligations.
One problem with this simple model is immediately obvious. If reputation
is gained by complying with a treaty, and if reputation is valuable, states could
acquire reputation simply by signing treaties that require them to do what they
plan to do anyway. Iceland could sign a treaty with Lesotho in which each
promises not to invade the other. No sensible model of reputation would
conclude that reputation can be acquired in this way. A similar problem exists
'" For example, Downs and Jones state: "No detailed justification of the traditional theory
of reputation exists in the literature," Downs & Jones, supra note 16, at 100.
20 From this point forward the Essay will speak in terms of treaties. An almost identical
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with the loss of reputation. There are instances in which everyone expects a
state to violate its obligations, and there is no reason why such violations
would generate a reputational loss. For example, a state may violate its
obligations under an environmental treaty because it is embroiled in a civil war
and parts of the country are unsafe for environmental officials. Under these
circumstances, a violation of the treaty yields no new information and,
therefore, cannot affect reputation.
These simple illustrations make it clear that a theory of reputation must take
into account the fact that not all agreements are the same. In particular, the
reputational inference that can be drawn from a compliance decision depends
in part on how the relevant obligation relates to what can be termed the state's
non-reputational payoffs. Suppose that the state is choosing between two
actions, which we label "comply" and "defect." These labels are chosen for
convenience-they come with no normative implications. If the state enjoys
higher payoffs by playing "comply," it does so, and if it would earn more by
playing "defect," it does that.
Now suppose that the state is party to a treaty through which it has
promised to play "comply." In order to understand the reputational
consequences of playing "comply" or "defect," it is first necessary to know
something about the state's non-reputational payoffs. If the non-reputational
payoffs give the state an incentive to comply, then it will do so whether or not
the treaty obligation is in place. In this case, the state's behavior is not
affected by the treaty, and so the state's action does not yield any information
about how it will behave when there is tension between the requirements of the
treaty and the non-reputational payoffs. The decision to comply, therefore,
carries no new information and has no effect on the state's reputation. Iceland
receives no reputational boost for complying with a non-aggression treaty with
Lesotho.
Suppose now that the state's non-reputational payoffs give it an incentive
to play "defect," creating tension between the two sources of payoffs. The
state will play "comply" if and only if the reputational payoffs it would receive
are sufficiently large to trump the non-reputational payoffs.
At this point it is necessary to consider the state's existing reputation, based
on which the expectations and beliefs of other states are formed. A state with
a good reputation is expected to comply more readily than a state with a poor
reputation. In terms of our example, a state with a good reputation is expected
to comply as long as what it gives up by complying (the difference between the
non-reputational payoff from compliance and that from defection) is no greater
than some amount, X. The state with a bad reputation is expected to comply
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as long as what it gives up is no greater than Y. The difference between a good
and bad reputation is reflected in the fact that X > Y. In other words, a state
with a good reputation is believed by others to be more willing to comply in
the face of incentives to defect than is a state with bad reputation. The
following figure illustrates this point:

Non-Reputational Payoffs & Compliance
0

Y

x

OPP Cast of Complyng

"Bad" Reputation State Complies
"Good" Reputation State Complies

The state with a good reputation is expected to comply over the entire range
to the left of X, while the bad reputation state is expected to comply only to the
left of Y.
A state is willing to invest in its reputation (by resisting the opportunity to
defect), because having a good reputation allows it to enter into more
profitable cooperative arrangements. Some states have a greater ability to
extract value from a good reputation. Some states, for example, have more
future opportunities for cooperation. These states gain from a good reputation
every time the state enters into international negotiations. Other states may not
expect to encounter as many instances in which an ability to make credible
promises is valuable. The former state has greater reason to invest in its
reputation than does the latter.
By observing a state's behavior, others draw inferences about whether their
existing estimate of reputation is accurate. Suppose, for example, that two
states start off with the same reputation, but one values reputation (because it
has more future opportunities to extract value from that reputation) more than
the other. Because they value reputation differently, the two states will behave
differently in at least some cases. Given an opportunity to defect and earn
some amount between X and Y(the opportunity cost of complying), the state
that values reputation more will play "comply" and the other state will play
"defect."
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Other states are assumed to know the non-reputational payoffs of the acting
state, and to have a belief about the state's willingness to comply with
international law (i.e., its reputation). Based on this information, an observing
state forms an expectation about what the acting state will do. In the above
example, it expects compliance if it believes the acting state to be a "good"
state, and expects defection if it believes the acting state is a "bad" state. Once
an action is taken, observing states update their beliefs. If the acting state has
done what was expected, the observing state has no reason to change its beliefs
(though it may develop greater confidence in those beliefs). If the acting state
behaved differently than expected, the observing state reconsiders its beliefs.
If defection was expected, but there was compliance, the acting state's
reputation will improve. If compliance was expected, but there was defection,
reputation will be hurt.
Much could be added to this simple theory. For example, the strong
informational assumptions could be relaxed or the effect of ambiguous legal
rules could be examined. But even without modifying the theory, several
implications are immediately apparent.
First, the relevant non-reputational payoffs matter a great deal. If those
payoffs provide a strong enough incentive to defect, not only will every state
defect but observing states will expect such behavior. Because defection is
expected, there will be no reputational sanction. More generally, every state's
decision to comply or defect will depend in part on the non-reputational
payoffs. Changes to these payoffs will lead to changes in compliance rates.
A trivial demonstration of this fact is the difference between coordination
games and prisoner's dilemma games. In the former the non-reputational
payoffs ensure cooperation, while in the latter they make defection likely. A
more concrete example might be one in which a failure to abide by an agreed
upon border is likely to lead to war. This is an example of a non-reputational
payoff that will often suffice to generate compliance. A decision to ignore
obligations under a human rights treaty, in contrast, may generate net benefits
for a state (or at least its political leaders). Contrary to Goldsmith and
Posner's claim, nobody would expect the compliance rates in each of these
examples to be the same.2
The discussion of non-reputational payoffs also makes it clear that a
reputation for compliance with international law is but one factor in a state's
decision. In fact, as Robert Keohane observes, there are other reputational
21GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 1,at 103 (stating that a under a reputational model "it
becomes more difficult to explain why some treaties generate more compliance than others").
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factors as well.22 To be precise, the reputation that has been discussed
throughout the paper could be called the "compliance reputation" to
distinguish it from other forms of reputation, such as a reputation for toughness
or resolve. But noting that other reputational concerns exist changes nothing
in our earlier discussion. Like the non-reputational concerns discussed above,
these concerns influence the state's compliance decision, but do not affect the
role of a state's compliance reputation. It remains the case that a state has
some incentive to comply with an international legal rule to preserve or
improve its reputation for compliance. That incentive will sometimes, but not
always, push a state from defection to compliance.
The key point is to recognize that reputation acts at the margin, like all
influences. If other relevant forces are sufficiently strong, they will swamp
reputational concerns, but when the other forces are less determinative,
reputation can affect outcomes. Therefore, the argument that, "a reputation for
compliance will not always be of paramount concern," does not justify the
dismissal of reputation as an influence on cooperation. 23
What about the claim that many treaties are obsolete? Does this suggest that
reputation can be ignored? One must first consider what it means for a treaty
to be obsolete. An obsolete treaty is one that is still formally in effect, but is
inappropriate for the existing situation, or for some other reason is considered
irrelevant by the parties. One possibility is that all states involved expect the
treaty to be ignored. This may be because the agreement has been dormant for
a long time, because circumstances have changed, or because technology has
rendered it irrelevant. Regardless of the reason, a treaty that states no longer
expect to have any relevance will presumably not generate any reputational
effects. The reason for this has already been discussed. When an acting
state's non-reputational payoffs give it an incentive to defect, observing states
will expect defection and so there will be no reputational sanction. This result
might be awkward from a doctrinal perspective, because it undercuts the
commonly cited claim that all legal obligations are equally binding, but from
the perspective of a rational choice model it is not problematic at all.
There may also be agreements that have relevance, but less than they
formerly had. These partially obsolete agreements can be thought of as
signifying a lower level of commitment than existed when they were first
entered into. This might be the case, for example, if the forces motivating the
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agreement are largely gone, but there is still value in the cooperation
generated. Thus, for example, some commitments entered into among NATO
states during the Cold War may have less force today than they did prior to the
collapse of the Soviet Union. It is not difficult to understand how agreements
of this sort might influence state behavior. A partially obsolete agreement will
simply have a smaller impact on a state's reputation.
It seems to me that this discussion of obsolete treaties says almost nothing
about the relevance of reputation. It points out the obvious fact that different
agreements implicate reputation in different ways (an idea to which I return
below), but this fact is already understood in the literature.2 4 It is not entirely
clear why Goldsmith and Posner find that the presence of obsolete treaties
undermines reputational theories. It is true that if one conceives of reputation
as the single dominating factor in all state decisions, then these treaties are
problematic, but as discussed above, nobody has advanced such a theory of
reputation.
Lastly, Goldsmith and Posner draw on the argument initially made by
Downs and Jones that states may have multiple reputations across issue areas.25
As Goldsmith and Posner put it, "A state might have a good record complying
with trade treaties and a bad record complying with environmental treaties. 26
Much could be said on the subject of whether reputation is compartmentalized
in this way and, if so, whether there is any spillover from one category of
reputation to another. There is, however, no need to explore those questions
here, because if reputation is compartmentalized in some fashion, it can still
be expected to affect behavior and, in fact, is likely to affect it more in at least
some areas than would be the case if states had a single reputation. To
illustrate this, suppose that we can identify two areas of importance to the
United States. Sticking with the examples used by Goldsmith and Posner,
assume these are the environment and trade.27 Suppose further that the United
States has a strong interest in preserving a good reputation in the trade sphere,
but a much smaller interest in the environmental area. This may be so, for
example, because the United States stands to gain a great deal from existing
trade arrangements, and because it hopes to be able to enter into future trade
treaties, such as a new WTO agreement or a treaty creating a Free Trade Area
See, e.g., Guzman, The Design of InternationalAgreements, supra note 20.
2 Downs & Jones, supra note 16.
24

GoLDsMrrIH & POSNER, supra note 1, at 102.
27 If reputation is compartmentalized by issue, the question is just what constitutes a single
26

issue area. That question is not directly relevant to the point made in the text and so it is put to
one side.
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of the Americas. By preserving a good reputation in trade, the United States
hopes to extract substantial concessions from its trading partners in exchange
for its own promises to liberalize. In the environmental area, however, assume
that the United States has much less interest in future agreements. This may
be so because the country does not view environmental issues as a grave threat,
or perhaps because the political dynamic of the country makes it a low priority.
Whatever the reasons, the United States is prepared to invest more in its trade
reputation than in its environmental reputation. What does this mean for
international law? It means that international law is likely to have some
success in affecting American behavior with respect to trade policy. Because
the United States values a good reputation in that area, it will have a strong
Not only does the
incentive to comply with its commitments.
compartmentalization of reputation not undermine the role of international law
in trade, it actually bolsters it. Because the American reputation with respect
to trade will be affected only by what it does in the trade area,28 it follows that
decisions with respect to compliance in the trade area have a bigger impact on
that reputation than would be the case if many non-trade actions also
contributed. The compartmentalization of reputation, then, increases the cost
of noncompliance in the trade area and makes international law more effective
than it otherwise would be.
Just the opposite effect would occur in the environmental area. Because the
United States does not care, or at least does not care as much, about its
reputation in this area, it has less incentive to comply with existing
commitments if reputation is highly compartmentalized.
The lesson, then, is not that compartmentalized reputation makes reputation
less relevant, but rather that it makes the effects of reputation more complex.
As compared to a single reputation, compartmentalized reputation will
generate stronger effects in some areas and weaker ones in others. Far from
indicating that reputation should be dismissed, this discrepancy suggests that
it should be studied with greater care so that we can understand where it is
likely to support a robust system of international law and where this is less
likely.

This assumes a complete compartmentalization of reputation. This seems implausible, but
illustrates the point that effective international law is consistent with a compartmentalized
reputation.
2"
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IV. CONCLUSIONS AND A RESEARCH AGENDA

This brief discussion of reputation is obviously not intended to be the final
word. The role of reputation needs to be understood in much more detail. The
point of this short Essay has simply been to demonstrate that a satisfying
theory of the role of international law must take reputational effects into
account. Without doing so it is simply not possible to argue persuasively that
international law is unable to resolve collective action problems.
At present, however, our understanding of reputation is primitive. There
are models of reputation in the literature of both economics and political
science, but for the most part they have not been applied to international law.
What is needed going forward, then, is a more thorough and thoughtful
discussion of reputation and its role in international law. What factors
influence the acquisition and loss of reputation? What is the role of
information in this process? Is reputation compartmentalized as Downs and
Jones argue, and, if so, are the various reputations completely independent
from one another, or is there some spillover from one area to another? Are the
relevant categories of reputation based on issue area, governmental regime,
bilateral country pairs, or some other criteria? These and other questions
should be addressed as we develop a more complete model of how
international law works.
There is no doubt that it is possible to generate a model of rational states
in which international law matters. Indeed, we already have such models in
the literature.2 9 International legal scholars should continue the project of
improving those models, including reputation as one area of focus. The other
critical avenue of research going forward must be empirical. The question of
whether international law affects outcomes has been and should continue to be
studied using quantitative methods. This will help us to identify the extent to
which theories of international law find support in the real world.
There can be no question that there are limits to what international law can
do. There are times when the incentives that states face are sufficiently strong
that we cannot hope for international law to affect behavior. It is also clear
that these instances in which the effect of law is swamped by other factors are
more frequent in some areas (e.g., national security) than in others (e.g., trade).
But there are also instances in which international law can affect the behavior

29
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of states.3 ° Exploring both the promise of international law and its limits is an
important project that will surely keep us busy for many years to come.

3o See Beth A. Simmons, Money and the Law: Why Comply with the Public International
Law of Money?, 25 YALE J. INT'L L. 323 (2000); Judith L. Goldstein, Doug Rivers, & Michael
Tomz, Institutions in International Relations: Understanding the Effects of GATT and the WTO
on World Trade (unpublished manuscript).

